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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the role of the ILO in promoting ‘financial inclusion’ in West Africa. The 
role of the ILO in microfinance and financial inclusion has often been overlooked, in contrast to 
the role played by the World Bank, G20, and like institutions. The ILO is significant here 
because it suggests a number of ambiguities and important political dynamics that have gone 
overlooked in previous critical discussions of microcredit, which have often focused on the 
politics of commercialization, indebtedness, and accumulation by dispossession. This article 
draws instead on Gramsci’s concepts of subalternity and organic crisis to suggest that the politics 
of ‘financial inclusion’ in practice are often shaped as much by the political dynamics 
engendered by the erosion of postcolonial order as by the imperatives of accumulation. The 
argument is illustrated empirically by examining ILO activities on microinsurance and ‘inclusive 
finance for workers in West Africa, with an emphasis on Senegal.  
  
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The International Labour Organization (ILO) is best known for its role in setting 
international labour standards. However, the ILO has long been involved in sub-Saharan Africa 
and elsewhere in the developing world across a number of areas relating to ‘financial inclusion’. 
The ILO’s role here is worth examining because it suggests that the politics of global finance are 
both more varied and more contested than is often assumed. The ILO participates in the same 
networks as most of the organizations more commonly associated with ‘financial inclusion’ like 
the World Bank, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and large NGOs like the 
Gates Foundation. Much of the current critical literature on financial inclusion and related topics, 
however, has tended to overlook the role played by organizations like the ILO, arguably because 
it has overwhelmingly focused on the politics of microcredit and debt (Soederberg 2014; Taylor 
2012; Bond 2013; Rankin 2001). This literature has made significant contributions both in 
explaining the rise of ‘financial inclusion’ and to critiquing the project. It has been compellingly 
argued that the discourse of ‘financial inclusion’ misleadingly constructs poverty as a problem 
created by a lack of finance (e.g. Taylor 2012; Weber 2004). In so doing, it neatly obscures the 
ways in which structural relations of power, including circulations of credit and indebtedness, 
contribute to the creation of poverty in the first place. Some authors have also made note of the 
exploitative tendencies implicit in commercialized microcredit, and the increasingly complex 
financial practices through which microfinance is tied into global circuits of financial capital 
(Soederberg 2013; 2014; Aitken 2013). 
 
The empirical examples in this article contribute to this agenda by studying an 
organization and forms of financial practice that have often been overlooked. Theoretically, I 
argue that if we pay attention to the broader range of practices and institutions involved in 
financial inclusion it also calls attention to political dynamics that have largely been overlooked 
in the existing critical literature. Drawing on Gramsci’s concepts of ‘organic crisis’ and 
subalternity, the ILO’s interventions into financial inclusion are interpreted in relation to the 
political crises created by the collapse of postcolonial systems for managing urban and rural 
labour in Senegal and elsewhere in West Africa. The ILO’s programmes on microinsurance and 
on finance for trade unions in Senegal have become entangled in struggles by the state and by 
trade unions to organize the ‘informal’ economy. Within the broader project of financial 
inclusion, then, emerging modes of accumulation by dispossession sit, sometimes awkwardly, 
alongside political struggles over the articulation of subaltern social forces. 
 
In the first section, I argue that looking at the role of the ILO highlights the multiplicity 
and indeterminacy of ‘financial inclusion’. This suggests the need for perspectives able to take 
account of the myriad political struggles through which these indeterminacies are played out. 
Where Marxian frameworks, often following David Harvey’s concepts of spatio-temporal 
displacement and accumulation by dispossession (2003), have served well to highlight the 
exploitative dynamics of the new forms of credit relations emerging around the project of 
financial inclusion, these need to be complemented by more explicitly political perspectives. I 
argue in the following section that Gramsci’s thought on subalternity provides some useful clues. 
The remaining sections then apply this perspective to an examination of the ways in which state 
and trade union actors in Senegal have engaged with two ILO projects related to ‘financial 
inclusion’. First, I briefly trace the history of labour in postcolonial Senegal. The final two 
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sections examine the activities of the Microinsurance Innovation Facility and the ‘Inclusive 
Finance for Workers’ initiative, respectively. 
 
THE ILO AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION: BEYOND DEBT 
 The ILO has often been overlooked in relation to the role of the World Bank and the G20 
with respect to promoting and governing financial inclusion (e.g. Henrikksen 2015; Soederberg 
2013; Bateman 2012), but it is not an ‘outside’ voice in the broader policy community dealing 
with microfinance and financial inclusion. The ILO does not dispose of the same resources as the 
World Bank, but is nonetheless a founding member of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), the major international policy body on financial inclusion, has been engaged in 
microfinance projects ‘on the ground’ since the early 1990s (see ILO 1994), and draws on 
occasion on funding from the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). Indeed, 
many of the staff of the Social Finance Branch at the ILO have worked for CGAP or other of its 
member organizations, especially the Gates Foundation. The ILO is normally not the most 
important or materially powerful player in these networks of institutions, but it is nonetheless 
present -- and on some particular issues, most notably microinsurance, it has played a central 
role. Focusing on the role of the ILO, then, highlights less an alternative approach to financial 
inclusion, and more a set of discursive and historical-institutional ambiguities within the broader 
networks emerging around the project of financial inclusion that might go unnoticed if we focus 
our attention squarely on the politics of debt or on the more ‘central’ institutions involved. 
 
There is an ambivalence in financial inclusion discourses between narratives about 
unleashing latent entrepreneurial drives by facilitating access to credit on one hand and the use of 
financial tools for risk management on the other. These are not mutually exclusive by any means, 
but they can lead to different policy prescriptions and an emphasis on significantly different 
forms of finance. The former ‘win-win’ narrative about expanded access to credit has generally 
received more attention in critical accounts. Feminist critiques of microfinance have been 
particularly adept at picking apart the deeply gendered discourse of entrepreneurship 
underpinning the narrative of microcredit as a form of empowerment (e.g. Rankin 2001; 2013; 
Maclean 2013). More broadly, critics have rightly highlighted the ways in which the notion of 
financial inclusion depoliticizes poverty by attributing it to exclusions from credit markets 
(Soederberg 2013; 2014; Taylor 2012; Gruffydd-Jones 2012). The ‘win-win’ narrative, 
moreover, often obscures the growing reliance of microcredit institutions on global financial 
markets through practices of securitization that often threaten to entrench the vulnerability of 
poor borrowers while creating new sites for accumulation by dispossession (Soederberg 2013; 
2014). Credit and debt, however, are only part of the story around financial inclusion. According 
to one ILO official:  
The primary discourse in financial inclusion ends up still gravitating towards micro-
enterprise loans even though it’s a much broader agenda… Entrepreneurs may take a 
couple steps forward in terms of increasing incomes, perhaps creating jobs, but then 
they’ll be worse off as soon as they’re struck by a risk of some sort if there isn’t a 
corresponding effort to provide them with risk management tools -- that’s promoting 
savings, perhaps access to emergency loans to help manage risks without going to 
moneylenders or selling off productive assets. It’s access to available social 
protection benefits and (we argue) increased access to better insurance services. 
(Author interview with ILO Official, July 2014, Geneva) 
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The ILO is certainly not alone in emphasizing these dimensions of ‘financial inclusion’. Indeed, 
the G20 principles on financial inclusion open with an acknowledgement that: 
Most people are already aware of how greater access to basic financial services 
through microfinance can transform lives and improve welfare. Awareness is 
growing that access to a wider set of financial tools, such as savings products, 
payment services… and insurance (including micro‑insurance directed at the needs 
of the poor), provides poor people with much greater capacity to increase or stabilize 
their income, build assets, and become more resilient to economic shocks. (AFI 
2010: 1) 
The World Bank has also increasingly moved towards a broader interpretation of poverty rooted 
in an understanding of risk and vulnerability (see Best 2013) -- including an emphasis on 
financial practices as means of managing risks (World Bank 2013). The ILO’s work is 
significant, though, because its practical activities lean especially heavily towards the ‘risk 
management’ dimensions of financial inclusion, which have generally received less attention 
than the ‘win-win’ story about credit. This risk management dimension, importantly, implies a 
focus on a broader range of practices, including savings, payment services, insurance, and even 
how these should be coordinated with publicly funded social protection (see e.g. Churchill 2006).  
 
Moreover, these discursive ambiguities map partially onto historical-institutional ones. If 
the globalization and commercialization of microcredit, housing finance, and similar practices 
are usefully situated in the context of (1) a broader crisis of overaccumulation dating to the 1970s 
which has led to a growing need for spatiotemporal fixes (see Harvey 2003), and (2) the growth 
of neoliberal strategies for the governance of poverty that increasingly rely on the promotion of 
credit as a means of securing the reproduction of labour (see Rankin 2013; Soederberg 2013; 
2014; Gruffydd-Jones 2012), the project of financial inclusion equally stems from a parallel 
history of interventions into cooperative finance in the developing world. It has often been 
argued that microfinance moved from its origins in these forms of solidaristic community 
finance towards a more explicitly commercialized basis, with heavy encouragement from the 
World Bank (see Bateman 2010; 2012; Aitken 2013). The ILO’s role in promoting financial 
inclusion, however, suggests that the former have not been eclipsed entirely -- this is clearly the 
case of microinsurance (see below, Dror and Jacquier 1999). The association of the ILO with 
non-commercial community finance often contrasts in practice with the market-oriented logic 
promoted by the World Bank and private foundations even around financial practices explicitly 
oriented towards risk management. 
 
 The point is that the project of ‘financial inclusion’ encompasses multiple overlapping 
discursive and institutional strands, which sit sometimes awkwardly together. This ambiguity in 
itself is not surprising, but it does suggest that the impacts of the project of financial inclusion in 
practice are likely to be more complex and multi-faceted than we might assume if we focus on 
critiquing ‘global’ policy frameworks. As Aitken (2013) notes, the current literature on financial 
inclusion and microcredit has rarely given much attention to the tensions and complexities 
involved in actually putting these frameworks into practice. Soederberg (2013) has highlighted 
the dynamics of what Cutler (2003) calls ‘localized globalism’ implicit in the project of financial 
inclusion, wherein neoliberal regulatory frameworks increasingly depend on enactments in 
‘local’ spaces. If these ‘global’ frameworks offer rather more ambiguous guidelines than has 
often been assumed, however, this would seem to give much greater importance to ‘local’ 
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agencies in the implementation of global projects like ‘financial inclusion’; and, moreover, these 
might end up looking less unambiguously ‘neoliberal’ in practice than might be assumed. What 
is needed, then, is a way of making sense of the myriad ‘local’ struggles through which these 
ambiguities are sorted out in practice. The following section argues that Gramsci’s concepts of 
subalternity and organic crisis offer a number of useful tools. 
 
GRAMSCI, SUBALTERNITY, AND GOVERNANCE 
Gramsci’s notes on the subaltern offer a perspective on political authority that centres on 
struggles to organize and mobilize subordinate social forces in particular ways. Gramsci argues 
that ‘the subaltern classes, by definition, are not unified and cannot unite until they are able to 
become a “State”: their history, therefore, is intertwined with that of civil society, and thereby 
with the history of States and groups of States’ (1971: 52). Gramsci identifies a range of avenues 
for inquiry into the formation of subalternity: 
‘It is necessary to study: 1) The objective formation of the subaltern groups, by the 
developments and transformations occurring in the sphere of economic production; 
their quantitative diffusion and their origins in pre-existing social groups, whose 
mentality, ideology and aims they preserve for a time; 2) their active or passive 
affiliation to the dominant political factions, their attempts to influence programmes 
of these formations in order to press claims of their own, and the consequences of 
these attempts in determining processes of decomposition, formation, and neo-
formation; 3) the birth of new parties of the dominant groups, intended to conserve 
the assent of the subaltern groups and maintain their control over them; 4) the 
formations that subaltern groups themselves produce, in order to press claims of a 
limited and partial character; 5) those new formations which assert the autonomy of 
the subaltern groups, but within the old framework; 6) those formations that assert 
the integral autonomy…’ (1971: 52) 
Gramsci’s understanding of the ‘subaltern’, then, refers in a general sense to people occupying 
subordinate positions in broader structures of production and political power. Crucially, though, 
this open-ended definition is used to call attention to the politics of organizing and mobilizing 
these populations in particular ways. Gramsci highlights an important degree of indeterminacy in 
this process: ‘The history of subaltern groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic… even 
when they rebel and rise up: only “permanent” victory breaks their subordination, and that not 
immediately’ (1971: 55). The picture that starts to emerge is of governance as a sort of ‘tug of 
war’ over the formation of subaltern consciousness, enacted in myriad ‘local’ spaces; in which 
‘Every trace of independent initiative on the part of subaltern groups should… be of incalculable 
value for the integral historian’ (1971: 55). This implies an analysis of particular regulatory 
projects, like financial inclusion, focused on the ways in which they are entwined with ongoing 
transformations in the relations of production and political struggles over the organization of 
subaltern populations. ‘Hegemony’, then, rather than being a sort of ‘master concept’ in 
Gramsci’s analysis (as it often is in neo-Gramscian IPE), refers to a particular conjunctural 
situation in which productive, political, and coercive forces solidify the dominance of one 
particular social group by securing the consent of subaltern populations. Far more common are 
situations of ‘organic crisis’, in which no such balance can be achieved (see 1971: 276). In short, 
if we build a Gramscian IPE out from the concept of subalternity, we end up with a focus on 
more open-ended, fluid, and multiple political struggles, rather than the dialectic of ‘hegemony’ 
and ‘counter-hegemony’. 
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This particular reading of Gramsci might bring him much closer to governmentality 
approaches to global politics. Following Foucault, the idea of ‘governmentalities’ emphasizes 
dispersed set of practices and discourses that produce certain forms of subjectivity (Foucault 
1991; Rose and Miller 1992). Governmentality approaches have been applied usefully to the 
project of financial inclusion and to everyday finance more generally (Langley 2006; Aitken 
2013; 2015). There is a good deal in common here with the emphasis above on the 
‘consciousness’ of subaltern social forces. However, I would suggest that Gramsci offers a more 
fruitful basis for analyzing the place of financial inclusion in struggles over the political 
organization of poverty because of his insistence on an ‘absolute historicism’ (1971: 465). The 
‘tug of war’ over subaltern social forces, for Gramsci, inevitably and continually overflows any 
particular set of governmental practices because its formation takes place against a multi-layered 
backdrop of historical and material trajectories. The focus of governmentality approaches is 
often on the techniques of government themselves; where Gramsci offers a means of situating 
these techniques in the context of underlying historic struggles. 
 
This leaves open the question of how to think about the spatiality of ‘financial inclusion’. 
The relationship between ‘global’ policy frameworks like ‘financial inclusion’ and their local 
iterations is particularly salient in the critical literature on ‘financial inclusion’ (see e.g. 
Soederberg 2013; Aitken 2013; Taylor 2012). The Gramscian perspective outlined above can 
usefully be extended to deal with this issue. As a number of more recent commentators have 
noted, Gramsci emphasizes the historically contingent nature of space and scale, implying that 
struggles over the subaltern are often articulated simultaneously across multiple scales of action 
(see Jessop 2005; Morton 2007; Ekers et al. 2014). While there is a good deal of debate about 
the extent to which Gramsci took seriously the significance of the ‘international’ (e.g. Germain 
and Kenny 1998; Ives and Short 2013; Morton 2007), it seems consistent with the broader 
methodological injunctions highlighted above to emphasize the interplay between ‘global’ and 
‘local’ forces in shaping struggles over the subaltern. If neoliberal frameworks (including 
‘financial inclusion’) are indeed enacted through a form of ‘localized globalism’ -- as Soederberg 
(2013) usefully suggests -- the Gramscian approach developed here directs us to look for the 
ways in which different ‘local’ or ‘national’ actors are not only disciplined by these frameworks 
of governance, but also how state and ‘civil society’ actors often work by enrolling and 
redeploying ‘international’ or ‘global’ resources in the context of ‘local’ struggles. 
 
Gramsci’s conception of subalternity, in short, suggests a useful alternative 
problematique within which to think about ‘financial inclusion’. Previous perspectives have 
focused on the ways in which particular financial and regulatory practices articulate certain 
subjectivities (e.g. Aitken 2013; 2015; Maclean 2013; Rankin 2013) or on outlining the 
particular forms of dispossession and depoliticization implicit in the agenda of ‘financial 
inclusion’ (Soederberg 2013; 2014; Taylor 2012; Weber 2004). Gramsci’s thought is 
complementary insofar as it highlights the extent to which the roll-out of financial inclusion in 
particular places should be understood in the context of struggles to re-organize subaltern 
populations in the context of organic crisis. 
 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE SUBALTERN IN SENEGAL 
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This section briefly traces the broader pattern of relations of force against which ILO 
policies on financial inclusion have been rolled out in Senegal. As the discussion of Gramsci in 
the previous section suggests, if we want to understand the particular shape of initiatives around 
financial inclusion in Senegal, we need to recognize the strategic imperatives for government and 
trade unions created by the organic crisis of the postcolonial order in Senegal. As Boone (1992) 
describes particularly clearly, political-economic order in postcolonial Senegal depended on the 
articulation of state monopolies over agrarian exports with local and foreign merchant capital, 
and with a series of mechanisms for securing the consent of subaltern groups, including urban 
employment in the civil service or in an industrial sector dominated by parastatals and agrarian 
cooperatives for rural workers. Importantly, as Bayart (2009: 182-192) has noted of postcolonial 
Africa more generally, this mode of extraverted development depended politically on the 
incorporation of substantial elements of subaltern social forces into the ‘postcolonial historic 
bloc’, often through the formation of a ‘civil society’ closely linked to the ruling party (as in e.g. 
the trade union politics discussed below). Boone suggests that this model was in crisis in the 
1980s because it depended on the redistribution of rents from export markets that were 
increasingly volatile and threw up significant barriers to the development of production. The 
process of structural adjustment was truncated in practice, including in Senegal (see Woods 
2006), but it did involve the ejection of many subaltern elements of the postcolonial historic bloc 
in the process of privatization of parastatals and the retrenchment of social programmes. Boone 
notes that the process of liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s led primarily to the solidification 
of the close relations of merchant capital and the state, while marginalizing other members of the 
postcolonial bloc (Boone 1994). With more specific reference to labour, two developments are 
relevant. 
 
First, trade unionism in postcolonial Senegal was premised on a particular model of 
relations between trade unions and the ruling party called ‘responsible participation’, which has 
also been thrown into question by structural adjustment (see Ndiaye 2010; Diop 1992). CNTS 
was established in the early 1970s after the government abolished the leaderships of existing 
national trade union bodies. The government adopted a policy of ‘responsible participation’ that 
granted CNTS members in the Parti Socialiste a share of cabinet seats and made all salaried 
worker members of the party into CNTS members (and vice versa) in exchange for industrial 
peace. At least implicitly, the arrangement rested on the differentiation of salaried formal 
workers from the precarious urban poor -- particularly insofar as these policies meant that public 
servants and workers in publicly owned enterprises made up a considerable proportion of CNTS’ 
membership. This arrangement was undercut from the early 1980s onwards by dual processes of 
structural adjustment and political opening. Among other things, (1) the devaluation of the 
regional currency (the CFA Franc) dramatically reduced real wages; (2) retrenchment and 
privatization led to major job losses in the public sector; (3) these costs of adjustment for 
workers led to intense debates within CNTS about whether or not to remain affiliated to the Parti 
Socialiste; and (4) political pluralism encouraged the formation of rival trade union 
confederations (see Diop Buuba 1992; Ndiaye 2010). These trends were accentuated when the 
Parti Socialiste lost the 2000 election, and CNTS subsequently opted to officially disaffiliate. 
The new government, meanwhile, encouraged the formation of new confederations out of rival 
tendencies in CNTS by greatly facilitating the registration of rival trade union centres. By 2010, 
CNTS remained the largest trade union body in the country with roughly 80 000 registered 
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members, but there were 18 officially recognized ‘national’ trade union confederations (see ILO 
2010: 28-34).  
 
Second, alongside this fragmentation of the union movement, the incidence of what 
Harrod (1987) calls ‘unprotected’ work -- precarious or marginal types of economic activity, 
lacking formal protections, directly or indirectly subject to the decisions of powerful actors in 
which workers have limited input -- has expanded considerably. Formal measures of 
unemployment have typically hovered around 10 percent (ILO 2013a; Diene 2014); but labour 
force participation rates for ‘working age’ individuals (15-64) are less than 50 percent. By most 
estimates the ‘informal’ sector accounts for the majority of value added across most sectors -- 
petty street vending, then, is increasingly accompanied by the informalization of transport, 
manufacturing, fishing, and agriculture (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012: 48-58). Indeed, a different 
indication of the scope of unprotected work comes from the fact that only 5 percent of the 
population participates in the national retirement fund -- a contributory scheme into which 
formal salaried workers typically pay (ILO 2013a: 31). In any event, the broader point is that 
widespread precarious labour threatens to undercut both the political significance of trade unions 
and the legitimacy of neoliberal modes of governance, and that the mechanisms by which 
subaltern social forces were incorporated into the postcolonial order have largely been 
dismantled in the process of structural adjustment. These dynamics explain to a considerable 
degree the ways in which the ILO’s interventions into financial inclusion have actually played 
out in practice.  
 
MICROINSURANCE AND SOCIAL PROTECTION 
The concept of microinsurance originates in debates in the 1990s about the extension of 
social protection to informal workers. The Social Protection Department of the ILO established 
an initiative on ‘Strategies and Tools against Social Exclusion and Poverty’ (STEP) in the late 
1990s. Under STEP, the ILO carried out a major study of healthcare mutuals in nine countries in 
West and Central Africa, which recommended that governments needed to establish a regulatory 
and institutional context for the autonomous provision of health insurance, international donors 
should focus on training at the local level (Atim 1998). A pair of officials in the Social Protection 
Department initially advanced the concept of ‘microinsurance’, referring to autonomous 
community-directed organizations linked together in larger corporate structures to facilitate the 
pooling of risk (Dror and Jacquier 1999), to describe alternate ‘community-based’ forms of 
social protection the ILO increasingly sought to promote in the 1990s. Microinsurance was thus 
articulated in STEP as part of a complex assemblage of state, community, and private institutions 
delivering social protection: 
A new and seemingly promising approach has been emerging in recent years. It 
consists of designing coherent and linked national health insurance systems based 
on several mechanisms (insurance, universal systems, targeted social assistance), 
which rely on a variety of actors (community based actors, social security 
institutions, public programmes) and a variety of sources of financing… (ILO 2007: 
5) 
Microinsurance ultimately never gained much traction in Social Protection. Most of the activity 
of the Department from the early 2000s was oriented towards a ‘policy vision’ based on 
universality, cemented in 2012 by the passage of the recommendation on ‘Social Protection 
Floors’. It suggested that ‘governments remain the ultimate guarantors of social security… 
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neither the market nor informal arrangements can guarantee adequate levels and universal access 
to effective social security’ (ILO 2009: 40). Microinsurance policy thus almost entirely passed 
over to the Social Finance branch in the early 2000s, and was also rapidly taken up by a growing 
network of other international and regional regulatory institutions.  
 
The networks emerging around the idea of ‘financial inclusion’ were particularly 
significant. The ILO’s Social Finance branch chaired a working group on insurance at CGAP, 
which began collecting case studies on microinsurance in the early 2000s (see Churchill 2006). 
An early training guide on microinsurance for microfinance institutions was also published in 
2003 (Churchill et al. 2003). The ILO institutionalized this loose movement linking 
microinsurance activities to ‘financial inclusion’ by establishing the Microinsurance Innovation 
Facility (MIF) in 2007. MIF is hosted at Social Finance, with funding from the Munich Re and 
Gates Foundations, as well as the IFC. This shift from Social Protection department to MIF and 
CGAP also drove some mutations in the practice of microinsurance itself. If the emphasis on 
community autonomy that dominated ILO activities in the 1990s never exactly went away, much 
of the practical work done by the MIF in promoting microinsurance has been carried out through 
engagements with insurance supervisors. The global regulatory framework for microinsurance 
thus clearly reflects the institutional ambiguity identified above. 
  
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the CGAP working 
group co-published an issues paper on regulatory frameworks for microinsurance in 2007. The 
paper highlights the role of regulation in promoting the expansion of microinsurance. Parts of the 
paper hew very closely to the market constituting logic of the World Bank’s work on microcredit 
or G20 principles that would be issued a few years later (see Henrikksen 2015; Soederberg 
2013). It suggests that regulatory frameworks for microinsurance need to balance ‘how they can 
contribute towards developing and overseeing microinsurance activities while simultaneously 
continuing to promote safe and sound financial systems’ (IAIS 2007: 38). There is a particularly 
important tension running through the guidelines, however, over the role of not-for-profit 
mutuals and cooperatives in relation to commercial insurance markets on the one hand and social 
protection functions on the other. The microinsurance paper notes the importance of clearly 
delineating the roles of public and market actors in providing social protection (2007: 15). Citing 
STEP publications on healthcare mutuals in Senegal and Mali, the paper argues that ‘The 
experience in West African jurisdictions shows that public redistributive systems often do not 
function in the informal economy. The only way for the poor to be covered is to set up 
microinsurance mutuals that are very inexpensive’ (2007: 21). Subsequent guidelines have also 
been published on the role of mutuals and cooperatives in delivering insurance. Here the role for 
community-based organizations in pooling risk is seen as a sort of ‘stepping stone’ towards the 
development of commercial insurance markets (IAIS 2010: 13). However, the range of other 
purposes for which mutuals can be used potentially complicates things: 
As [mutuals and cooperatives] can be part of a range of social and economic policy 
areas including financial services, agriculture, social welfare, health and community 
relations, the likely range of interested agencies can be greater than would be the 
case with… other forms of insurers… It is also likely that arrangements for 
effective, complete, and coordinated oversight… will have to consider a wider 
range of potentially competing objectives that will require special attention. (2010: 
14) 
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Mutuals and cooperatives are thus identified simultaneously as stepping-stones and/or substitutes 
for both conventional insurance markets and public redistribution and social protection. In the 
IAIS guidelines microinsurance is simultaneously linked with the public provision of social 
assistance, with community-level mutual or cooperative organizations, and with the development 
of commercial insurance markets.  
 
These guidelines have been put in practice in West Africa through a series of complex 
engagements between the ILO, the World Bank, and the Conférence Interafricaine des Marchés 
d’Assurances (CIMA), a regional network of insurance regulators harmonizing standards in 
fourteen countries in West and Central Africa. CIMA passed a set of regulations on 
microinsurance and index insurance (Livre VII) in 2012 aimed at encouraging the development 
of microinsurance institutions in member countries. The rules themselves were based on a report 
commissioned from Desjardins International Development (DID) by the World Bank on the 
microinsurance market in the region. The report identified the prominent role of community 
groups in existing insurance markets -- particularly healthcare mutuals -- as a particularly salient 
feature of the West African market. The DID report emphasizes the need to bring mutuals under 
existing regulatory requirements as much as possible (DID 2011: 56). 
 
However, the CIMA rules restrict the commercialization of microinsurance to a greater 
degree. The rules do seek to bring mutuals and community organizations under insurance 
regulations. Mutuals are subject to lower initial capital requirements than limited liability 
corporations (300 million F CFA rather than 500 million), but are otherwise required to follow 
the same rules. However, the CIMA rules relatively strictly segment microinsurance product 
lines from other financial services. They require microinsurance enterprises to seek a license 
from national regulators specifying which types of insurance they are permitted to offer. 
Organizations offering credit or savings services are restricted to life insurance; microinsurers 
offering health, crop, or property insurance are prohibited from offering savings or credit 
products. Livre VII similarly allows registered insurance providers to offer microinsurance 
products, but requires them to keep distinct accounts for their microinsurance operations. The 
regional regulations, then, are set up largely within the market-constituting logic laid out by the 
IAIS and DID, but leave a considerable role for community organizations and set limits on 
commercial activities. Indeed, they carve out certain (relatively unprofitable but politically 
significant) areas of activity -- health and crop insurance in particular -- as domains in which 
microinsurers must be set up as independent institutions. 
 
Microinsurance and the politics of informality 
Activity specifically relating to the CIMA rules in Senegal originates in a World Bank 
report on index insurance for agriculture commissioned by a newly established public-private 
agricultural insurance provider. The report recommended that the provider establish a publicly 
subsidized ‘social safety net’ for small farmers based on yield-indexed insurance (World Bank 
2009). The ILO’s Social Protection Department, meanwhile, was helping to develop a national 
policy framework for social security for informal workers. There was little specific discussion of 
microinsurance, but, as with many of the discussions under STEP in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, finding alternative mechanisms for the delivery of social protection to informal workers 
was a main focus of the ILO’s attention. A report published in 2013 had identified insurance 
mutuals and microfinance institutions as potential delivery and payment channels for a national 
 10 
‘Simplified Regime for Small Contributors’ (RSPC) (ILO 2013b: 40). Much of this work would 
subsequently end up being re-directed towards microinsurance policy in 2014, where funding 
from the IFC and organizational support from MIF were available. 
 
The ways in which these partially conflicting guidelines have been put into practice has 
been strongly influenced by struggles to organize subaltern populations. The Senegalese Ministry 
of Finance and Direction des Assurances, MIF, and the UN Capital Development Fund, ran a 
national planning workshop on microinsurance policy in Dakar in August of 2014. The 
workshop settled on a policy framework for microinsurance that was noticeably tailored towards 
the mobilization of community organizations in the provision of social protection -- especially 
health insurance. The ILO sent the specialists in social security who had helped draft the report 
on the RSPC along with specialists in microinsurance. The workshop report is explicit about the 
‘social protection’ framework within which the country’s microinsurance policy strategy was to 
be developed: ‘Current social protection covers about 20 percent of the population, as against the 
majority of Senegalese citizens… working in the rural and informal sectors, who are excluded’ 
(ILO 2014a: 3, author’s translation). The conference settled on a plan of action including 
financial education, training for microinsurers, advocacy, and regulatory reforms to support the 
expansion of microinsurance (ILO 2014a: 7).  
 
A follow-up workshop was held in September of 2014, again in Dakar, aimed at 
elaborating more specific courses of action. Workshop recommendations stressed the need for a 
state-led financial education programme with the explicit objective to ‘stimulate demand in an 
ethical and responsible manner’ (ILO 2014b: 7, author’s translation). It also laid out a consumer 
protection role for regulators, in line with the CIMA rules, calling for the Direction des 
Assurances to ‘exercise a strict control over insurance companies and intermediaries, and to 
screen all insurance products that will be presented to the public’ (ILO 2014b: 7, author’s 
translation). In short, the segmentation evident in Livre VII of microinsurance products from both 
other financial services (i.e. credit and savings) and from more established forms of insurance is 
carried over into the Senegalese policy. The Senegalese plan, then, involves delegating social 
protection for informal and agricultural workers primarily to the voluntary sector, but in a way 
that is actively organized, through a variety of education programmes, subsidies, and regulatory 
mechanisms, by the state. Initiatives in the agrarian sector, where a publicly subsidized index 
insurance provider is already in place (see above), might be read in a similar way. The rollout of 
microinsurance in Senegal, in short, depends on the articulation of a complex network of ‘local’ 
organizations, NGOs, international organizations, and state institutions in ways that are 
profoundly shaped by the strategic imperatives created by the organic crisis of the postcolonial 
order. 
 
 An important precondition for the articulation of this network is the set of ambiguities 
implicit in the ‘global’ frameworks governing financial inclusion in general and microinsurance 
in particular, noted in the first section above. The World Bank in particular has generally sought 
to establish private microinsurance markets in Senegal, while the ILO’s activities have tended, 
even as far back as STEP in the late 1990s, to prioritize the social protection dimensions of 
insurance and the role of ‘voluntary’ community organizations. IAIS and CIMA guidelines have 
often struck an awkward balance between the two. It is the considerable degree of ambiguity 
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implicit in this framework that makes the ongoing political struggle to redefine relations between 
the state and the subaltern in the context of crisis particularly important. 
 
TRADE UNIONS AND SOCIAL FINANCE 
 The broader argument for the critical importance of ongoing political struggles over the 
subaltern is made even clearer if we consider a set of parallel ILO projects on financial inclusion 
for trade unions in sub-Saharan Africa. These latter projects also highlight particularly clearly the 
significance of the multiplicity of possible articulations of subaltern social forces that Gramsci 
highlights, as well as the ambiguity and multiplicity of ‘financial inclusion’ as a framework 
insofar as they represent parallel, partially contradictory projects drawing on many of the same 
international resources as the initiatives around microinsurance discussed in the previous section. 
 
 Much of the ILO’s work on finance for workers, beginning in the early 2000s, has been 
oriented specifically towards the problems of maintaining and expanding trade union 
membership. The ILO’s first intervention into this area, called SYNDICOOP, aimed explicitly to 
use cooperative finance as a means of recruiting and organizing informal sector workers in East 
Africa (see Smith 2013; Smith and Ross 2006). The initiative began in 2002, initially covering 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda; Kenya was added in 2004. The programme helped to put in 
place a model for the use of cooperative credit mechanisms as means of organizing informal 
workers. A representative of the African regional section of the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions, speaking at a workshop on SYNDICOOP in 2004, argued that  
We should bear in mind that workers -- wherever they are -- have only one home and 
that is the trade union. We should therefore campaign for workers in the informal 
economy for them to gain recognition by the authorities. Laws that protect these 
workers should be put in place. Services like training, credit, amenities, and so on, 
should be provided. In other words, measures that guarantee the smooth functioning 
of the informal sector should be put in place. (qtd. ILO 2004: 20). 
SYNDICOOP positioned credit and financial services as a tool in the organization of ‘informal’ 
workers. An extension to SYNDICOOP was originally planned in collaboration with the African 
regional branch of the International Trade Union Confederation and the Organization for African 
Trade Union Unity. This project was stalled by a struggle between the two regional 
confederations over control of the project. What eventually emerged instead was a training 
programme operated by Social Finance called ‘inclusive finance for workers’ (IFW). There have 
been three regional workshops for national confederations -- in Lomé in 2011, Kisumu, Kenya in 
2012, and Dakar in 2013 -- and the ILO has also provided follow-up assistance to some 
workshop participants on the basis of requests. As with MIF, we need to look to the ways in 
which the ILO’s work has become enmeshed with ongoing struggles to organize subaltern 
populations in order to understand the shape of IFW in practice.  
 
CNTS and MECSO  
The Mutuelle d’Épargne et de Credit pour la Solidarité Ouvrière (MECSO) was 
established at the CNTS annual general assembly in 2005. MECSO’s mission is identified as 
‘reduc[ing] the precarity of work, especially among those in the informal economy, by providing 
quality local financial services at minimal cost’ (MECSO 2012: 4). The organization operated on 
an informal basis from 2005-2008, before being formally registered with the Ministry for the 
Economy and Finance in 2008.  
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Aside from this stated mission, MECSO officials identify two underlying objectives.1 
The first, quite simply, is to maintain or expand the membership of the union. Credit is disbursed 
to small local groups, called cercles, organized among people working in particular economic 
sectors. Organizing cercles is a way to keep retrenched workers in certain sectors the union. This 
is notably the case in fisheries -- a considerable number of commercial fishing boats in Senegal 
have ceased operations in recent years. These were heavily unionized operations, and so the loss 
of fisheries jobs threatens to cut significantly into CNTS’s membership. Providing credit through 
MECSO for retrenched fishermen to operate their own boats thus provides a means for CNTS to 
keep them in the federation. Similarly, the cercles can be used to expand the union’s membership 
in the informal economy. MECSO has organized cercles among street vendors, especially 
women working in informal food processing and small-scale restaurants in Dakar. The reliance 
on the cercles structure is understood as an exercise in solidarity -- a kind of proto-union 
formation that should start organizing informal workers, and eventually enable members 
participate more fully in CNTS.  
 
A second related purpose of MECSO is the formalization of the informal economy. Here 
CNTS’s objectives are linked to the preservation and expansion of public social security. The 
very limited extent of contributions to public social security (noted above), poses significant 
challenges for traditional social security in Senegal (of which unionized workers remain 
important beneficiaries). MECSO uses credit as a means of ‘formalizing’ informal businesses. If 
workers take out business loans through cercles affiliated to MECSO, their activities (and their 
revenues) are recorded and identified as a result. The thinking on MECSO’s part is that workers 
whose revenues are thus identified and formalized will also be able to make contributions to 
social security programmes. MECSO’s objectives here are somewhat in conflict with the 
microinsurance schemes discussed in the previous section. Rather than developing new forms of 
social security through private and community-based insurance systems, MECSO (in putting this 
emphasis on formalization) seeks to expand the scope of the existing public system. 
 
 The key point here is that MECSO’s operations, although they are based on the provision 
of access to financial services, are used towards the preservation of the union and of a particular 
model of state authority (one based in universal public provision and thus rather different from 
that implicit in the micro insurance project highlighted above) in the context of a crisis in the 
‘objective formation’ of work in Senegal. It should, in short, be read as a project aimed at 
enrolling a particular subaltern population -- unemployed or precarious workers in the region of 
Dakar -- into a particular mode of political consciousness in the context of the erosion of union 
membership and growing competition between different union centres discussed above. It is thus 
also indicative of the ‘room to move’ available within the broader project of financial inclusion.  
 
We should be cautious in assessing the actual impacts that MECSO has had in this respect. 
Exact numbers of participants in the programme are hard to come by, but in 2012 MECSO had 
roughly 400 borrowers, along with 517 ‘auxiliary’ members participating in a daily savings 
group. MECSO also had three affiliated agents operating in suburbs of Dakar -- two informal 
artisans’ associations in Rufisque totalling roughly 950 members and one agent in Guédiawaye 
who worked with a pair of informal women’s workers’ associations (MECSO 2012). In total, 
then, MECSO regrouped roughly 1800-2000 members including those working with agents -- 
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this is probably a conservative estimate of the number of people actually participating in 
MECSO because many of these ‘borrowers’ would have been cercles (in short, undertakings 
involving multiple people). Another indicator of the extent to MECSO’s operations might be to 
say that the mutual held roughly 23 million worth of outstanding credits in the first quarter of 
2012, along with roughly 5 million of reserves (MECSO 2012: 9-10). These are relatively large 
figures among MFIs in Senegal, where the average (registered) MFI held slightly more than 600 
000 FCFA in outstanding credits in 2009 and 66 000 in reserves (the last year for which 
published numbers are available), although it would still only have accounted for about 1 percent 
of the credit loaned out by 172 registered MFIs in 2009 (BCEAO 2010: 5).2 Two points are 
nonetheless worth underlining. First, MECSO’s basic model of operations -- using credit and 
savings products to organize informal workers -- is very similar to practices used elsewhere. 
Probably the most notable example is the Self-Employed Women’s Association in India (Kapoor 
2007). The SYNDICOOP project outlined above also suggests that the practice is relatively 
common elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, although at present little research exists to confirm 
this point. If nothing else the potential exists for MECSO’s operations to expand significantly. 
Second, and relatedly, the primary means by which MECSO has sought to accomplish this is by 
participating in the broader project of ‘financial inclusion’ -- mainly through IFW. In short, 
whatever the impacts of MECSO on the politics of subalternity in Dakar, MECSO has had a 
considerable impact on the way in which IFW has worked out in practice in Senegal. 
 
In relation to this latter point, the way in which the activities of the ILO under IFW fit into 
the broader regulatory context around microfinance in Senegal is significant. The Banque 
Centrale des Economies de l’Africque de l’Ouest (BCEAO) passed financial reporting guidelines 
for MFIs in 1998 (BCEAO 1998). Senegal’s regulatory framework was amended in 2008, with 
technical assistance from Canada, Belgium, and the UNDP, largely in response to concerns from 
the BCEAO about the viability of MFIs and the extent of unregistered and unregulated 
microfinance in Senegal (e.g. BCEAO 2008). The 2008 law cracked down on informal 
operations by cooperative credit institutions -- which included MECSO’s early operations -- 
especially by strengthening accounting and reporting requirements. These new reporting 
requirements posed a number of operational problems for MECSO. MECSO relies on the 
election of CNTS members as volunteers to staff positions. This inherently creates relatively 
high staff turnover, so training officials to file adequate reports poses a significant and ongoing 
challenge. Alongside such regulatory restrictions, it would be difficult to expand MECSO’s 
operations by drawing only on ‘local’ resources because the basic objectives of MECSO, to a 
certain extent, dictate that the financial viability of their lending products is a secondary concern: 
‘For a financial institution that’s not operating in the framework of workers’ 
solidarity like MECSO, the problem is how to make money. They don’t worry about 
the members; it’s about how to make the operation profitable. So for us, as a 
workers’ organization, we have an obligation to create a system that aims purely to 
provide assistance.’(interview with MECSO official, November 2014, Dakar) 
The ILO does not directly provide funding under IFW, but MECSO has tried to draw on 
the ILO’s programming to alleviate funding shortfalls in two ways. First, MECSO leans on the 
ILO to provide training for new functionaries. MECSO has managed to offset training costs by 
participating in the ILO’s workshops and by requesting follow-up assistance. Second, MECSO 
views participation in the ILO’s workshops -- including IFW, along with other events attended 
by workers from the global North -- as opportunities to make connections with potential donors. 
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Involvement with the IFW and the ILO more broadly is, similarly, a way of legitimizing 
MECSO to these potential donors. MECSO, in short, is a decidedly local project; indeed it 
operates almost entirely in the Dakar region, yet the sustainability of MECSO over the longer-
run depends on the kinds of ‘international’ links it is able to establish. Indeed, the group’s 
publications explicitly acknowledge this point (e.g. MECSO 2012: 10). 
 
The particular relationship between the ILO and MECSO is again best explained with 
reference to the struggles over subaltern populations stemming from the organic crisis of the 
postcolonial order. The basic strategic imperatives underpinning MECSO’s operations stem 
directly from the ongoing transformations of trade union politics and labour markets highlighted 
above. Moreover, as with MIF, the particular modes of engagement that MECSO has taken with 
respect to IFW are greatly facilitated by the ambiguities in the broader project of financial 
inclusion. IFW, while committed to the project of financial inclusion, offers a means of 
maintaining or expanding MECSO in the context of changing regional and national regulatory 
requirements and ongoing resource limitations.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The ILO’s activities around social finance in Africa suggest two important conclusions. 
First, it is notable how trade unions, state actors, and others have navigated a maze of ILO, 
World Bank, BCEAO, CIMA, and donor policies without ever overtly resisting ‘financial 
inclusion’ as such. The agency of subordinate actors in the global economy, in short, need not 
make itself felt only through explicit protests. Rather, the ILO’s programmes have become 
entangled in struggles to organize subaltern social forces in the context of an organic crisis of the 
postcolonial order in Senegal. Second, and more broadly, this suggests the usefulness of 
exploring the enabling effects of ambiguity and fragmentation in global governance more 
broadly along the lines of the Gramscian approach adopted here. 
 
 This approach helps us to make sense of the practice of financial inclusion by pointing to 
the importance of contestation over the political organization of subaltern social forces in 
explaining the outcomes of ‘global’ policy. Studies in IPE more generally, not only of financial 
inclusion, have tended to focus on the latter almost to the exclusion many times of the former. 
The everyday enactments of ‘global’ frameworks, however, are often contested in ways that 
profoundly shape their impacts; in short, the present article suggests the value in tracing ‘global’ 
projects all the way down to the ‘local’. Rather than assuming the disciplining of ‘local’ spaces 
through ‘global’ policy initiatives like financial inclusion, we need to be attentive to the ways in 
which the programmes developed by global and regional authorities become entangled in ‘local’ 
or ‘national’ struggles through the actions of ‘local’ or ‘national’ actors. Existing critical 
perspectives (e.g. Soederberg 2014; Taylor 2012; Weber 2004) are able to offer a theoretically 
and empirically rich consideration of the ways in which financial inclusion maps onto broader 
patterns of capitalist accumulation and neoliberal governance. They offer a very useful 
explanation and a compelling critique of the rise of ‘financial inclusion’ discourse, and helpfully 
highlight the dynamics of power often left out of mainstream accounts. The Gramscian approach 
adopted here, by contrast, offers us a useful framework both for explaining the form taken by 
‘local’ iterations of ‘financial inclusion’ and for analyzing the ways in which the ambiguities 
implicit in financial inclusion create the conditions for what Gramsci would call ‘molecular’ 
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forms of action in the context of particular historical struggles over the political organization of 
subaltern populations. 
 
NOTES 
1) The following draws on the author’s discussions with MECSO officials in Dakar in November 
of 2014. 
 
2) This is, of course, at best a rough guess at MECSO’s share of the ‘national’ market because 
the figures are from different sources and cover different years, but 2009 is the latest year for 
which national figures are available. 
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